Theory · Game Theory and Computational Economics

TitleAuthors
A Robust Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism for Contextual AuctionsYuan Deng · Sébastien Lahaie · Vahab Mirrokni
Equitable Stable Matchings in Quadratic TimeNikolaos Tziavelis · Ioannis Giannakopoulos · Katerina Doka · Nectarios Koziris · Panagiotis Karras
Fast and Furious Learning in Zero-Sum Games: Vanishing Regret with Non-Vanishing Step SizesJames Bailey · Georgios Piliouras
Learning Auctions with Robust Incentive GuaranteesJacob Abernethy · Rachel Cummings · Bhuvesh Kumar · Sam Taggart · Jamie Morgenstern
Optimal Pricing in Repeated Posted-Price Auctions with Different Patience of the Seller and the BuyerArsenii Vanunts · Alexey Drutsa
Optimistic Regret Minimization for Extensive-Form Games via Dilated Distance-Generating FunctionsGabriele Farina · Christian Kroer · Tuomas Sandholm
Efficient and Thrifty Voting by Any Means NecessaryDebmalya Mandal · Ariel Procaccia · Nisarg Shah · David Woodruff
Efficient Regret Minimization Algorithm for Extensive-Form Correlated EquilibriumGabriele Farina · Chun Kai Ling · Fei Fang · Tuomas Sandholm
Learning to Correlate in Multi-Player General-Sum Sequential GamesAndrea Celli · Alberto Marchesi · Tommaso Bianchi · Nicola Gatti
Multiagent Evaluation under Incomplete InformationMark Rowland · Shayegan Omidshafiei · Karl Tuyls · Julien Perolat · Michal Valko · Georgios Piliouras · Remi Munos
Poincaré Recurrence, Cycles and Spurious Equilibria in Gradient-Descent-Ascent for Non-Convex Non-Concave Zero-Sum GamesEmmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis · Lampros Flokas · Georgios Piliouras
Strategizing against No-regret LearnersYuan Deng · Jon Schneider · Balasubramanian Sivan
Correlation in Extensive-Form Games: Saddle-Point Formulation and BenchmarksGabriele Farina · Chun Kai Ling · Fei Fang · Tuomas Sandholm
Discrimination in Online Markets: Effects of Social Bias on Learning from Reviews and Policy DesignFaidra Georgia Monachou · Itai Ashlagi
Distinguishing Distributions When Samples Are Strategically TransformedHanrui Zhang · Yu Cheng · Vincent Conitzer
Manipulating a Learning Defender and Ways to CounteractJiarui Gan · Qingyu Guo · Long Tran-Thanh · Bo An · Michael Wooldridge
Prior-Free Dynamic Auctions with Low Regret BuyersYuan Deng · Jon Schneider · Balasubramanian Sivan